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I. INTRODUCTION
"All bad precedents began as justifiable measures."
-Julius Caesar,
While Caesar's words still have impact and import in 1994, the
legal system he knew certainly bears little resemblance to the modern
practice of law. Indeed, a time traveler from as recently as three decades ago might not recognize today's legal profession. Legal employment is undergoing rapid changes and is witnessing several
significant trends.2 First, a growing number of attorneys practice in
large, multi-office law firms.3 While a law firm with 100 attorneys
was considered remarkably large, the legal profession has grown tremendously, and now 100 member firms are commonplace. 4 An accompanying change in the legal profession is the increasing mobility of
attorneys, for no longer do most lawyers spend their entire careers at
one firm.5 One reason for this increased mobility is that, the economic
difficulties faced by the legal profession in the 1990's have led many
firms to down-size, forcing many attorneys to transfer to other firms or
practice individually.6 Additionally, the practice of law today is
largely regarded as a business, rather than a genteel practice. 7 With
the emphasis on business practicality, law firms now merge, spin-off,
1. SALLUST, SALLUs''s BELLum CATILINAE (J.T. Ramsey ed. 1984).
2. Donald R. McMinn, Note, ABA Formal Opinion 88-256: New Justificationfor Increased Use of Devices to Avert Attorney Disqualification,65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1231,
1231 (1990).
3. Id.
4. Id. at n.1 (citing Note, UnchangingRules in ChangingTimes: The Canons ofEthics and Intra-FirmConflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1059, 1078 (1964)(arguing
for changes in the conflict of interest doctrine because of the recent development
of 100-member firms).
The world's largest law firm, Baker & McKenzie, employs 1,642 attorneys.
Thom Weidlich, Firms: Baker Verdict not Major Concern, NATL L.J., May 30,
1994, at A6. In a 1989 survey over 250 American law firms had more than 100
attorneys.
5. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.9 cmt. (1989)(stating that
"today... many [lawyers] move from one association to another several times in
their careers"); McMinn, supra note 2, at 1231; Lateral HiringActivity Among
New York Firms,N.Y.L.J., Nov. 13, 1989, at 34 (survey showed "unprecedented
[number of later moves] at both the associate and partnership levels").
6. Jeffrey Garon, Successive Conflict of Interest and the Motion to Disqualify: The
Impact of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct, 47 SMU L. REv. 399, 399
(1994).
7. Steve Jordon, New Rules Enter Field of Law: Today's PerryMasons Face Competition, Other Major Changes, OMAiA WORLD HERALD, Oct. 17, 1994, at 1 (quoting
Creighton University Law Dean Lawrence Raful as saying, "For many years, we
never thought of our selves as being in the business of law as much as we were in
the service of helping others. I hear lawyers tell me, 'This is a business now,' and
that's very sad. You were a counselor at law. That meant you counseled people.
Now we're in the business of practicing law.").
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and reform with the same regularity as businesses in any other
industry.8
While all of these changes may be in the best economic interest of
the profession, they also have raised new and troubling questions
about what it is to be a lawyer. Ethical rules and guidelinesthat were
formulated to guide a stolid profession from a "counseling" perspective
are inadequate to handle the realities of the mobile, competitive, fastpaced modern practice of law. One area where the failure of the law to
keep up with the profession is most striking is the area of attorney
conflicts of interest. The increasing size, mobility and volatility of
legal employment has increased the possibility that a lawyer and his/
her firm will have to address the ethical problem of a conflict of interest between two of its current clients or between a current and former
cient.9
As the potential for conflicts and motions to disqualify have increased, the courts have struggled to formulate workable rules to deal
with conflicts of interest. On the one hand, the courts must balance
the protection of client confidences. On the other, the court must recognize the expectations of a subsequent client and the changed nature
of legal employment.1o Most courts have done so by creating conflicts
of interest rules that are increasingly flexible and fact-driven.11 The
Nebraska Supreme Court, however, has chosen to deal with the problem of increasing conflicts of interest by articulating a rigid, brightline rule that generally favors disqualification.1 2 This new rule has
significant implications for the legal profession, the courts, and the
public.13
In Part II, this Note will first provide an overview of the doctrines
underlying imputed or vicarious disqualification. Next, in Part III, it
will address the facts of the Nebraska Supreme Court decisions in Nebraska ex rel. FreezerServices, Inc. v. Mullen,14 Nebraska ex rel. FirsTier Bank, N.A. v. Buckley,15 and Nebraska ex rel. Creighton
University v. Hickman.16 Part IV will provide an overview of how
other jurisdictions deal with imputed disqualification, and Part V will
8. Mergers are now so common that the NATIONAL

LAw JouRmNA

has a regular col-

umn to help attorneys keep up with who has merged with whom.
9. See GEOFFrEy C. HAZARD, Ja., ETIcs 3w THE PRACTICE OF LAw 81-82 (1978)(noting that "risk of conflict rises exponentially with the size of the firm.. ."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Close Watch Must be Kept for Conflicts, NATL L.J., Sept. 26,
1988, at 13 (stating, "Today, the risk of a disqualification motion has become
ever-present.").
10. See infra Part IV.

11. Id.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Parts M and V.
See infra Part VI.
235 Neb. 981, 458 N.W.2d 245 (1990).
244 Neb. 36, 503 N.W.2d 838 (1993).
245 Neb. 247, 512 N.W.2d 374 (1994).
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examine how the Nebraska rule is unique in light of approaches from
other jurisdictions. Finally, Part VI will highlight the problems created by the Nebraska rule, and Part VII will advocate steps which
should be taken to remedy these flaws.
II.
A.

IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: AN OVERVIEW

Treatment Under the Model Code

7
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code")1
gives attorneys clear guidance regarding actual conflicts of interest.
Canon 5 of the Model Code establishes that a lawyer owes undivided
loyalty to his/her client. Model Code Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-105
prohibits a lawyer from accepting employment or engaging in multiple
employment if it will lead an attorney to represent "differing interests."' 8 The duty to preserve client confidences survives the termination of the attorney-client relationship.' 9
The Model Code does not specifically address vicarious (or imputed) disqualification. Some courts have used Canon 4 and Canon 9

17. The Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility and the Model Rules of Profes-

sional Conduct are standards promulgated by the American Bar Association
(ABA), and one or the other has been adopted in most state and federal jurisdictions to govern the conduct of attorneys. The Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, which is comprised of Canons, Ethical Considerations (EC) and
Disciplinary Rules (DR), was adopted by the ABA in 1969. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct were adopted by the ABA in 1983 and were intended to
supersede the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. At this time the Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct have been adopted in approximately thirty-five jurisdictions. Nebraska is governed by the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Thus, this overview discusses only the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and not the newer Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct. For complete treatment of comparison of the Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct and the
Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility see, GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL.,
TH LAW AND ETmcs oF LAWYERnG (David L. Shapiro, et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994).
For discussion of how the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility and Model
Rules of Professional Conduct differ in respect to the specific issue of attorney
disqualification for conflict of interest, see, Jonathan J. Lerner, An Overview of
the Law Governing Legal Conflicts of Interest, in LEGAL ETmcs 1990: WHAT
EVERY LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. H4-5099, 1990); Sheldon Raab, New Frontiersin Conflicts of Interest:
The Mobile Attorney - When to Build a Chinese Wall in LEGAL ETmcs 1990:
WHAT EVERY LAWYER NEEDS To KNOW, at 180-189 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. H4-5099, 1990); Julius Denenberg & Jeffrey R.
Learned, Multiple Party Representation, Conflicts of Interest, and Disqualification: Problems and Solutions, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 497 (1992).
18. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (1980). The Model
Code of ProfessionalResponsibility defines the term "differing interests" to "include every interest that will adversely affect either the judgement or the loyalty
of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other
interest." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Definitions (1980).
19. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6 (1980).
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to justify vicarious disqualification. Courts taking this approach have
generally relied most heavily on Canon 4, which simply states, "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client." Model
Code DR 5-105(D) has been invoked to support vicarious disqualification once a Canon 4 violation has been found.2o Canon 9 of the Model
Code provides that "a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."21 Although Canon 9 does not provide specific
guidelines for attorney behavior, some courts apply the following twopart test: (1) Is there some specifically identifiable appearance of improper conduct? and (2) Is there a likelihood of public suspicion that
outweighs the social interest served by allowing a litigant to be represented by the attorney of his/her choice?22 Commentators criticize
disqualification based on Canon 9, arguing that "the inherent lack of
clarity in the term 'appearance of impropriety' makes it difficult for
courts to establish any firm guidelines and leads to inconsistent and
questionable rulings."2 3 Courts have likewise criticized the use of Canon 9, concluding that it "is simply too slender a reed upon which to
rest disqualification."24 Indeed, not only have courts and commenta20. See, e.g., Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on
jurisdictionalgrounds, 450 U.S. 903 (1981). But see NFC, Inc. v. General Nutrition, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 332, 334 n.2 (D. Mass 1983)(finding imputed disqualification not specifically required by Model Code.).
21. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSiONAL RESPONSIBIrY Canon 9 (1980).

22. See, e.g., Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725, 729 (11th Cir.
1988)(applying the two part test to disqualify a challenged attorney); Petroleum
Wholesale, Inc. v. Marshall, 751 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)(applying
similar formulation of Canon 9).
23. Denenberg and Learned, supra note 17, at 502. See also Victor H. Kramer, The
Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon Nine: A Study of the Federal Judicial
ProcessApplied to Lawyers, 65 Mnn. L. REv. 243, 264-65 (1980); Neil D. O'Toole,
CanonNine of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility:An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 313 (1979).
24. Board ofEduc. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 836 F.2d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1988)(declining to use Canon 9 as justification for disqualification); United States v.
Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1442 (10th Cir. 1987)(holding that Canon 9 does not
require disqualification remedy); Ah Ju Steel Co. v. Armco, Inc., 680 F.2d 751,
754 (C.C.P. 1982)(stating that Canon 9 is too imprecise to justify disqualification); Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., No. 87 Civ. 0150, 1994 WL
141951, at *13-*18 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)(holding that Canon 9 is not enough to require
disqualification absent some actual threat to taint trial); United States v. Martin,
824 F. Supp. 208,211 (M.D. Ga. 1993)(finding that the appearance ofimpropriety
will only be grounds for disqualification in the "rarest cases.... The facts in this
case simply do not amount to one of those rare cases where disqualification for
appearance of impropriety is required."); President Lincoln Hotel Venture v.
Bank One, Springfield, Nos. 1-92-2380, 1-92-2668, 1994 WL 533796, at *8 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994)(stating that "an attorney cannot be disqualified solely on the
ground that there exists 'an appearance of impropriety' because Canon 9 by itself
is 'simply too weak and too slender a reed' upon which to order disqualification.")(citations omitted); Schmidt v. Pine Lawn Memorial Park, Inc., 198 N.W.2d
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tors questioned the wisdom of Canon 9, the American Bar Association
itself has rejected this standard.25
Whether a court is operating under the Model Rules 26 or the Model

Code, when it reviews a litigant's motion to disqualify a law firm, it
must examine three relationships. First, the court must consider
whether the moving party had a previous attorney-client relationship.
If the movant did not, the attorney is not disqualified.27 If there was a
prior attorney-client relationship, the court must next examine the relationship between the two matters. If previous matter and the current matter are not substantially related, the attorney is not
disqualified.28 Finally, the court must examine the relationship between the movant and the subsequent client. If their interests are not
materially adverse, the attorney will not be disqualified. 29
When the court is considering vicarious disqualification, the analysis is two-tiered.3o "The court first determines whether the individual
attorney is disqualified [using the three step analysis outlined
above].... If the attorney is disqualified, the court must then determine whether the disqualification should be imputed to the attorney's
new flrm."3' This analysis is best explained in terms of two
presumptions.
B. The First Presumption
The first presumption centers on the information that a challenged
attorney received during his/her association with the first firm and is
itself composed of two presumptions. First, the courts generally presume that a client discloses secrets to his/her attorney while the attorney is representing the client. Thus, the threshold inquiry in a motion
to disqualify based on a prior representation is whether the moving
party was actually a cient.32 If the moving party never established
an attorney-client relationship with the challenged lawyer, then there
can be no basis for the claim that the client reasonably expected the
information conveyed to the attorney to be, in fact, privileged. Once it

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

496, 502-03 (S.D. 1972Xstating "appearance of impropriety" standard too vague
to require entire firm to be disqualified).
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 342, at n.17
(1975)(rejecting Canon 9 as "too vague a phrase to be useful").
See supra note 17.
Denenberg & Learned, supra note 17, at 498.
Lerner, supra note 17, at 29-30.
Denenberg & Learned, supra note 17, at 500-503.
Mark Brodeur, Building Chinese Walls: CurrentImplementation and a Proposal
for Reforming Law Firm Disqualification,7 REv. LIG. 167, 170 (1988).
Id.
Joseph T. McLaughlin et al., Disqualificationof Attorneys and Judges, C842 ALIABA COURSE OF STuDY: Civ. PRAC. AND LrIIG. TECH. IN THE FED. Ors. 785, 789
(1993).

19951

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

is established that he/she was in fact actually a client, the movant
must then show that the matters in which the attorney previously represented the former client are "substantially related" to the pending
litigation. If the two matters are "substantially related," the courts
presume that client confidences and secrets have been passed to the
attorney and disqualify him/her. 33 Although there is a split between
the courts on this issue, the majority of courts have held this presumption to be irrebuttable.3 4 This strict standard is justified by the reasoning that "requiring the court to investigate whether confidences
actually had passed would force the client to reveal the confidences,
destroying the very protection that the Canons, the Model Code and
the Model Rules have provided."3 5 Some circuits have mitigated this
rule by adopting a "peripheral representation" exception. Under this
exception, if the attorney is being vicariously disqualified, then the
presumption is rebuttable.36
33. See, e.g., supra note 32, infra note 34.
34. Brodeur, supra note 30, at 171. See, e.g., Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100
(10th Cir. 1985)(holding presumption irrebuttable and disqualifying firm); Kevlik
v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 851 (1st Cir. 1984)(holding presumption irrebuttable
and disqualifying firm); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d
1341, 1347 (5th Cir. 1981)(refnsing to allow external evidence to rebut presumption that client had shared confidences with former attorney); Trone v. Smith,
621 F.2d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1980)(declaring that "it matters not whether confidences were in fact imparted to the lawyer by the client" once it has been established that an attorney-client relationship existed); Arkansas v. Dean Foods
Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 386 (8th Cir. 1979)(holding that policy considerations
mandate that the court should not inquire into whether client actually revealed
confidences), overruled on issue of appealabilitysub nom. In re Multi-Piece Rim
Prod. Liab., 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566
F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1976)(holding presumption irrebuttable and disqualifying attorney); Emile Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc.,
478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973)(holding presumption irrebuttable and disqualifying attorney); Nissan Motor Corp. v. Orozco, 595 So.2d 240, 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992)(finding presumption of shared confidences is irrebuttable). But see EZ
Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc. 746 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(holding presumption rebuttable but not rebutted in this case); Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrum. Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1982)(allowing attorney to rebut
presumption of shared confidences); Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1056-57
(2d Cir. 1980)(recognizing that presumption could be rebutted but holding it had
not been rebutted in the case at bar); Parker v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 781 P.2d
1099, 1105 (Kan. 1989Xremanding motion to disqualify to trial court for full evidentiary hearing as to whether confidential information was actually shared with
challenged attorney while he was associated with prior firm).
35. McMinn, supra note 2, at 1247.
36. See Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 755-57 (2d Cir. 1975)(aU
adopting this exception to the irrebuttability of the first presumption); City of
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 210 (N.D. Ohio
1976), aff'd without opinion, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
996 (1978).
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The second part of the first presumption operates on the realization that attorneys within a firm frequently share information with
each other about their clients. Thus, even if an attorney does not personally represent a client, knowledge of all the information that the
client divulges to a partner or associate of the firm is imputed to any
attorney associated with the firm. This imputation applies to all3 7 atof
torneys affiliated with a firm, including temporary attorneys,
counsel, and co-counsel. 3 8 The result is that all lawyers with any relationship to a firm, regardless of personal involvement, are deemed to
have shared in client confidences and are personally disqualified. This
presumption stems from various Model Code provisions, including DR
5-105(D), which extends a lawyer's disqualification to all partners and
associates in the firm, and from Canon 4 and Canon 9.39
C.

The Second Presumption

Once an attorney is found to have actual or imputed knowledge of a
case during a prior association with the opposing law firm or attorney,
the second presumption is triggered. That presumption holds that the
disqualified attorney will share information with all attorneys in his/
her new firm. Therefore, the new firm is disqualified en toto. This
presumption also stems from DR 5-105(D). As indicated above, DR 5105(D) of the Model Code by its terms appears to create an absolute
bar to representation by any lawyers affiliated with a lawyer who is
personally disqualified from that representation. At this stage, firm
disqualification can only be avoided by rebutting the presumption that
confidences will be shared. There are three alternatives that have
been used to avoid the operation of the second presumption.
Some courts have held that a law firm that recognizes the potential
for a disqualification motion obtain the former client's consent to the
subsequent adverse representation. 40 If, however, the court is granting disqualification because of the Canon 9 prohibition against the appearance of impropriety, a waiver may not prevent disqualification. A
client can not waive the bar's interest in maintaining the trust and
respect of the community.
A few courts allow a second alternative for avoiding disqualification of the entire firm due to the taint of an associated attorney. The
moving party can seek a protective order from the court that would
impose "a detailed court-ordered and supervised embargo on any com37. "Temporary attorneys, by virtue of their peripatetic nature, accumulate imputed
knowledge from several firms; this may create conflicts of interest and imputed
disqualifications for both the attorneys and the firms that employ them." McMim, supra note 2, at 1269.
38. American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971).
39. Diane E. Ambler, Lateral Hiring Conflicts, 5 INsiGHTs 7 (1991).
40. Raab, supra note 17, at 355-57.
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munications between personnel of [a law firm] and [the personally disqualified lawyer now with the firm] with regard to any matter related
to this litigation."41 The United States Supreme Court has endorsed
the use of a protective order to avoid the drastic measure of
disqualification.42
In most cases, the only practical way to rebut this presumption is
to employ the third alternative and erdct an institutional screening
device or "ethical wall".43 A screen is a set of steps taken within a law

firm to ensure that an infected attorney is isolated from the matter
with which he/she has a conflict. Among the elements of an effective
screening device are "the prohibition of discussion of confidential matters, limited circulation of documents and restricted access to files."44
Some courts also require the tainted attorney to receive no share of
any fees generated by a client with which he/she has a conflict.45 The
screening device is a recent innovation in the law. Until 1977, no
court recognized the application of the method for private firms, 4 6 de-

spite the fact that it was routinely employed by securities firms and
banks to avoid analogous conflict of interest problems.47 However,
given the changing conditions of the profession,48 many courts have
41. NFC, Inc. v. General Nutrition, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 332, 334 (D. Mass. 1983). See
also Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass.
1987)(court would upon additional evidence issue protective order to prevent
plaintiff's attorneys from engaging in ex parte communications with defendants
former office). At least one commentator advocates the use of protective orders to
avoid the "drastic" "all-or-nothing nature of attorney disqualification." Raab,
supra note 17, at 357-59. The author bolsters his argument for increased use of
protective orders by pointing to situations where courts have imposed such orders, mentioning Nebraska's use of protective orders in order to limit adverse
pretrial publicity. Id.
42. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 n.13 (1981).
43. These screening devices are sometimes called Chinese walls. However, because
of the potentially inappropriate ethnic connotations of this term, this Note will
join those who have preferred to refer to these mechanisms by the more accurate
term "screen" or "screening device." See H. Low, "ChineseWall"Adds to a Barrier
of CulturalMisunderstanding,TiE REcoiDER, Apr. 21, 1988. One court has criticized the term "Chinese wall" because it is "suggestive of attempts in the context
of a large law firm to physically cordon off attorneys possessing information from
the other members of the firm[;] ... an approach [which] tends to cast a shadow of
disrepute on attorneys separated in this manner from their professional colleagues." Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418,428
(D. Del. 1986). The court expressed its preference for the term "cone of silence"
which "more appropriately describes the responsibility of the individual attorney
to guard the secrets of his former client.L" Id.
44. Lerner, supra note 17, at 71.
45. Id.
46. Brodeur, supra note 30, at 177-78.
47. Larry L. Varn, The Multi-Service Securities Firm and the Chinese Wall: A New
Look in the Light of the Federal Securities Code, 63 NEB. L. REV. 197, 211-16
(1984).
48. See supra Part I and accompanying notes.
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accepted and some have even actively encouraged the use of screening
mechanisms to avoid conflicts of interest. 4 9 There are some courts,
however, that hold the second presumption to be irrebuttable. 50 In
these jurisdictions, once an individual attorney is "tainted" with
knowledge about the opposition, the entire firm must be
disqualified.51
When lawyers are disqualified because of the operation of one of
these presumptions, they are subject to "single imputation." For example, if attorney A is personally disqualified because, even though
she has no actual knowledge of a prior client's case, knowledge from
prior associates is imputed to her, then there is only one presumption
operating against her. Likewise, when a firm is disqualified because
the court imputes the actual knowledge of an attorney to the entire
firm, the only presumption operating is that the "infected" attorney
will, perhaps inadvertently, share this information with his/her new
affiliates. This single imputation has been the target of a great deal of
academic criticism not only because of the hardship it works against
attorneys and clients, but also because any danger of prejudice to the
previous client could have easily been prevented. 52
When both presumptions work together, however, the challenged
firm is subject to "double imputation," whereby an attorney's imputed
knowledge is then, in turn, imputed to his/her new firm. In this situation there is no actual conflict. The firm has no access to confidential
information because the "infected" attorney has no information to im49. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
50. Id.
51. The operation of these two presumptions is particularly draconian considering
the jurisdictional position that motions to disqualify occupy. The United States
Supreme Court has limited the jurisdiction of federal appellate courts over appeals from disqualification motions by holding that decisions granting or denying
attorney disqualification motions are interlocutory and not subject to appeal as
final judgments. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 425
(1985)(providing that grants of disqualification motions are not subject to appeal
as final judgments); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 370
(1981Xstating that denials of disqualification motions are not subject to appeal as
final judgments).
Once the case has been finally disposed of, in order to overturn a judgment
adverse to the current client's interest, the disqualified firm must show that it
would have prevailed had it remained counsel to the client. See Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 440-41 (2d Cir. 1980)(discussing, in dictum, the legal test
governing appeal of final judgment), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106
(1981). For an additional discussion of the procedural status and problems of a
motion to disqualify, see McMinn, supra note 2, at 1265 n.255.
52. See, e.g., Steven H. Goldberg, The FormerClient's DisqualificationGambit:A Bad
Move in Pursuitof an EthicalAnomaly, 72 MINN. L. Rav. 227 (1987)(criticizing
the use of imputation to disqualify attorneys and arguing that disqualification is
not a solution to conflict of interest).
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part.5 3 This approach has been subject to nearly universal criticism.
Further, it has not been accepted by any jurisdiction in which it had
been argued;5 4 nevertheless, this is the approach adopted by the Nebraska Supreme Court in its consideration of this issue. 55
I.

FACTS-NEBRASKA EX REL. FREEZER SERVICES, INC. v.
MULLEN;56 NEBRASKA RY REL. FIRSTIER BANK, N.A. v.
BUCKLEY57 AND NEBRASKA EX REL. CREIGHTON
UNIVERSITY v. HICKMAN58

In Nebraska ex rel. FreezerServices, Inc. v. Mullen,59 Freezer Services' attorney was originally North & Black, with John North, Jr. serving as the lead attorney in the litigation. McGrath, North, Mullen &
Kratz, P.C. (McGrath, North) was opposing counsel. In 1989, Freezer
Services dismissed North & Black and hired Cline, Williams, Wright,
Johnson & Oldfather (Cline, Williams). North & Black assisted Cline,
Williams in preparing for the pending litigation. After North &
Black's involvement with Freezer Services had ended, North & Black
merged with McGrath, North. In August of 1989, Cline, Williams
60
found out about the proposed merger, and objected to the situation.
McGrath, North explained that it had erected a screening device
whereby all employees were instructed not to discuss the case with
any former North & Black employee and all files were kept locked in
6
an office to which North, Jr. and his associates did not have access. '
53. Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 880,387(8th Cir. 1979)(stating that
'[Dloubling up on the imputation theory of Canon 4 in this case would be logically

unjustiflable-[the tainted attorney] could not impart knowledge he did not have.
It would also be ethically unjustifiable, requiring the invention of actual conflict
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

where none exists."), overruled on issue of appealabilitysub nor. In re MultiPiece Rim Prod. Liab., 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980).
See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
See infra Part V.
235 Neb. 981, 458 N.W.2d 245 (1990).
244 Neb. 36, 503 N.W.2d 838 (1993).
245 Neb. 247, 512 N.W.2d 374 (1994).
235 Neb. 981, 982, 458 N.W.2d 245, 247 (1990).
Id. at 983, 458 N.W.2d at 248.
Id. at 984, 458 N.W.2d at 248. Shortly before the North & Black merger, the lead
attorney handling the Freezer Services litigation at McGrath, North circulated a
memorandum which read, in part:
With respect to this litigation or any other matter regarding [the parties], the following rules will apply:
1. You should not discuss this litigation or any matters which might relate in any way to [the parties] with any members of North & Black, P.C.
who become employees of this firm. This includes any staff members of
North & Black, P.C.
2. Do not request any information or documents from these new
employees.
3. All files regarding this litigation will remain in my office in a locked
file cabinet under my control.
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Freezer Services nevertheless filed a motion to disqualify McGrath,
North.62 The district court overruled the motion to disqualify, but
specifically required McGrath, North to continue the office practices
they had instituted to isolate the North & Black attorneys and staff.63
Freezer Services appealed. Since McGrath, North did not dispute the
conclusion that North, Jr., had to be disqualified, the only question on
appeal was whether to impute North, Jr.'s disqualification to McGrath, North. McGrath, North argued that it could rebut the presumption that North, Jr. would share his knowledge with his new firm
by showing that it had adopted procedures to prevent information
about the case from flowing through the disqualified attorney to the
rest of the firm.64 Although the Nebraska Supreme Court stated in
dicta that the presumption of shared confidences might be rebuttable
through the use of an ethical wall, it refused to apply it here. 6 5 The
court overturned the lower court's order. In so deciding, the court specifically limited its ruling to the situation where the infected attorney
was intimately involved in representing the prior client. As the court
put it:
[Wihen an attorney who was intimately involved with the particular litigation

has obtained confidential information pertinent to that litigation, terminates the relationship and [then] becomes associated with a firm which is representing an adverse party in the same litigation, there arises an irrebuttable
and the entire firm must be disqualified
presumption of shared confidences,
66
from further representation.
...

The court emphasized that in this case, the "infected" attorney was
67
"deeply involved" in the litigation before moving to the second firm.
Following FreezerServices, the court heard the case of Nebraskaex
rel. FirsTierBank, N.A v. Buckley.68 In that case, FirsTier was being
sued by two separate plaintiffs, both alleging self-dealing by the bank
in regard to trusts held by the bank. In 1971, the time of the disputed
transaction, the bank was represented by the firm of Fitzgerald,
Brown, Leahy, McGill & Strom (Fitzgerald, Brown). That firm represented the bank against similar allegations by different plaintiffs regarding different trusts. In 1988, eight attorneys from Fitzgerald,
Brown left and, with others, formed the firm of Lieben, Dahlk, Whit4. Members of the law firm North & Black, P.C. who become employees
of this firm and any of its staff will be advised of these procedures.
5. Any new employees of this firm will be advised of these procedures as
well.

Id.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 985, 458 N.W.2d at 248.
Id. at 989, 458 N.W.2d at 250-51.
Id. at 992, 458 N.W.2d at 252.
Id. at 993, 458 N.W.2d at 253.
Id.
244 Neb. 36, 503 N.W.2d 838 (1993).
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ted, Houghton, Slowiaczek & Jahn, P.C. (Lieben, Dahlk). Lieben,
Dahlk represented the plaintiffs in the current action against FirsTier. FirsTier moved to disqualify, claiming that since this case was
similar to the earlier settled claim, Lieben, Dahlk should be disqualified by virtue of some of its attorneys' former association with Fitzgerald, Brown.6 9 Of the attorneys who moved from Fitzgerald, Brown to
Lieben, Dahlk, only one, T. Geoffrey Lieben, was associated with Fitzgerald, Brown at the time of the alleged self-dealing and the settlement of the estate dispute. 70 Lieben submitted all his time sheets
from the time-frame in question, which showed that on no occasion did
he work on any of the files involved. 7 1 FirsTier admitted that there
was no evidence that Lieben had ever had any involvement with FirsTier in its capacity as a client of Fitzgerald, Brown.72 The Nebraska
Supreme Court nevertheless disqualified Lieben and imputed that
disqualification to the entire Lieben, Dahlk firm.73
In so doing, the Court announced a "bright line" rule that "an attorney must avoid the present representation of a cause against a client
of a law firm with which he or she was formerly associated, and which
cause involves a subject matter which is the same as or substantially
related to that handled by the former firm while the present attorney
was associated with that firm."74 It does not matter if the attorney
can prove that he/she personally did no work for this client. The court
explained that matters are "substantially related" if counsel could
have received confidential information from the former client that
could subsequently be used against it.75
In adopting this rule, the court said it was acting to achieve two
goals. First, the court sought to protect the first client's right to preserve its confidences.7 6 Second, the court considered the public's perception of the legal profession, invoking the Canon 9 prohibition on
the appearance of impropriety. 7 7 The court asserted that a client will
be reluctant to confide in his/her attorney if there is a possibility that
a member of the firm will eventually end up working for opposing
counsel.78

69. Id. at 38-39, 503 N.W.2d at 840.
70. Id. at 38. 503 N.W.2d at 840. In fact, he was the only member of Fitzgerald,

Brown that had moved to Lieben, Dahlk who had even been an attorney in 1971.
Id.
71. Id. at 40, 503 N.W.2d at 841.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 45, 503 N.W.2d at 844.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 43, 503 N.W.2d at 843.
76. Id. at 45, 503 N.W.2d at 844.
77. Id.

78. See id.
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The court further clarified this new rule in Nebraska ex rel. Creighton University v. Hickman.79 Creighton University was suing American Medical International, Inc. (AMI) and St. Joseph Hospital, Inc.
(AMISUB). Creighton was represented by McGrath, North. AMI and
AMISUB were represented by Bickel & Brewer, a Texas firm. Bickel
& Brewer relocated several attorneys and support staff to Omaha to
handle this litigation. In order to handle the quantity of information
generated by discovery, Bickel & Brewer hired several temporary employees through an employment agency. One of the employees sent by
the agency was Lesli Walzak, a disbarred attorney, who previously
worked for McGrath, North: Walzak had logged about 40 hours on this
case and had written memoranda about this litigation.SO In obtaining
employment with Bickel & Brewer, Walzak misrepresented her former association with McGrath, North, claiming that she had worked
only as a clerical and administrative employee. When directly asked if
she had any contact with any matter concerning Creighton, Walzak
lied by telling Bickel & Brewer that she had not.8 1 During the course
of her employment with Bickel & Brewer, Walzak was recognized by
members of McGrath, North who informed Bickel & Brewer of the
true nature of her past association with the firm and the case. Bickel
& Brewer immediately dismissed Walzak. Nevertheless, Creighton
filed a motion to disqualify Bickel & Brewer.8 2 The trial court denied
the motion, finding that Creighton had failed to show that Walzak was
"intimately involved" with the particular litigation, as required by the
holding in Freezer Services.83 Creighton petitioned for a writ of
mandamus.
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that it was not necessary that
the attorney (or in this case, former attorney) have had intimate involvement with the litigation as grounds for disqualification of a law
firm.84 Instead, the court broadened its "bright line" rule of FirsTier
by applying it to nonlegal employees who were not intimately involved
with the litigation while with their former employers.85 Although
Walzak was not an attorney at the time she was employed by Bickel &
Brewer, and although she may have performed only clerical tasks for
Bickel & Brewer, the court held that the rule announced in FirsTier
was applicable and required the disqualification of Bickel & Brewer.8 6
While the court recognized that the second client had an interest in
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

245 Neb. 247, 512 N.W.2d 374 (1994).
Id. at 250, 512 N.W.2d at 376.
Id.
Id. at 250, 512 N.W.2d at 377.
Id. at 252, N.W.2d at 377.
Id. at 251, 512 N.W.2d at 377.
Id. at 253, 512 N.W.2d at 378.
Id.
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being represented by the attorney of its choice, it determined that
avoiding the appearance of impropriety outweighed the hardship.87
IV. CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Federal Courts
The way the federal courts have approached imputed disqualification is relevant to a discussion of state rules of disqualification for two
main reasons. First, when federal courts adopt by local rule the ethical rules of the state in which they sit, federal disqualifications are
often interpretations of state rules.8 8 Second, many state courts look
to approaches utilized by the federal courts when formulating their
own position on ethical issues in general and imputed disqualification
in particular.89 The federal courts are currently split on the issues of
which presumptions in a motion to disqualify are rebuttable and what
evidence is sufficient to overcome each presumption. 90
In Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.91, the
Second Circuit cautioned against a "blanket approach" to disqualification that would employ disqualification frequently, noting the many
negative consequences of using disqualification too frequently. The
court stated that in order for disqualification to be appropriate, there
must be a "realistic chance that confidences were disclosed" by the former client to the challenged attorney.9 2 In Government of India v.
Cook Industries,93 the same circuit court stated that the issues in the
87. Id. at 252, 512 N.W.2d at 378. (stating that "We are not unmindful of the hardship this places upon AM! and AMISUB in the underlying action. However, this
hardship is outweighed by the necessity of maintaining the confidentiality of
Creighton's communications with McGrath, North and of avoiding the appearance of impropriety.").
88. David W. Garland, Ethical Conflicts and Professional Considerations--Selected
Issues, in C780 ALI-ABA CouRsE OF STvUy. EmmoYMENT DISCRmNATION AND
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS ns FEDmiAL AND STATE Couzrs 686-688 (1993).

89. A number of courts have turned to case law from the federal courts for guidance
in deciding whether to grant disqualification motions. See, e.g., Chambers v. Superior Ct. of Shasta County, 121 Cal. App. 3d 893, 897-903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981);
Queen's Quest Condominium Council v. Sea Coast Builders, Inc., No. 89C-0C7,
1992 WL 68912, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992); SK Handtool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., 619 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Richers v. Marsh & McLennan
Group Assoc., 459 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Iowa 1990); Parker v. Volkwagenwerk A.G.,
781 P.2d 1099, 1103-05, (Kan. 1989); Nebraska ex rel. Freezer Servs., Inc. v. Mullen, 235 Neb. 981, 458 N.W.2d 245 (1990); Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 416 A.2d
852, 858-63 (N.J. 1980); Berg v. Marine Trust Co., NA, 416 N.W.2d 643, 647-48
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987); Carlson v. Langdon 751 P.2d 344, 347-49 (Wyo. 1988).
90. Brodeur, supra note 30, at 179.
91. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975), overruled en bane on other grounds sub non. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980).
92. Id. at 757.
93. 569 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d
433 (2d Cir. 1980).
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second matter must be "identical" or "essentially the same."94 The

Second Circuit had never upheld the use of a screen in a case involving a nongovernment lawyer. 9 5 Thus, in the Second Circuit, the challenged attorney may be able to rebut the first presumption, that he/
she shared in confidential information from the previous firm, but
may not use the screening defense to rebut the second presumption,
that he/she will share that information with the new firm. While Second Circuit courts seem satisfied that most attorneys would not intenthey are
tionally divulge confidential information relating to the case,
96
concerned with the ongoing risk of inadvertent disclosure.
The lead case regarding disqualification in the Third Circuit is INA
Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Rubin.97 There, the Third Circuit

Court of Appeals allowed the challenged firm to rebut the second presumption through the use of screening. 98 The court also specifically
noted the minimal contacts the disqualified attorney had with the adverse party, 99 which implies that it may view the first presumption as
rebuttable.
The Fifth Circuit considers both presumptions rebuttable. In In re
American Airlines,Inc. 100 the court reaffirmed its position that an attorney may rebut the first presumption that he/she actually received
confidential information from the previous firm. In LeMaire v. TexaCo., Inc.,101 a district court in the Fifth Circuit did not even require a
formal screen, allowing testimonial evidence to be used to rebut the
presumption that a migrant attorney had shared his confidences with
the members of his new firm. The court held that the presumption of
shared confidences was rebuttable and that vicarious disqualification
need not be automatic. 102 If the LeMaire court was willing to accept
post-facto testimonial evidence as proof that confidences had not been
would certainly rebut the presumption of
shared, an ethical 10wall
3
shared confidences.
94. See also Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
754 (2d Cir. 1975), overruled en banc on other grounds sub noma. Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980).
95. Raab, supra note 17, at 214.
96. See e.g., Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1058 (2d Cir. 1980)(upholding disqualification since the law firm involved was "relatively small" and the attorney's
activities would inevitable bring him into "day-to-day contact with defense counsel"), vacated on jurisdictionalgrounds and remanded, 450 U.S. 903 (1981).
97. 635 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
98. Id. The court cautioned, however, that screening may be impractical in many
situations. Id. at 5.
99. Id. at 5.
100. 972 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1992).
101. 496 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
102. Id.
103. Raab, supra note 17, at 221-22.
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The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have likewise held that both presumptions are rebuttable.104 In Schiessle v. Stephens,lO5 the Seventh
Circuit adopted a three step test for disqualification:
First, we must determine whether a substantial relationship exists between
the subject matter of the prior and present representations. If we conclude a
substantial relationship does exist, we must next ascertain whether the presumption of shared confidences with respect to the prior representation has
been rebutted. If we conclude this presumption has not been rebutted, we
must then determine whether the presumption of shared confidences has been
rebutted with respect to the present representation.1 0Failure
to rebut this pre6
sumption would also make disqualification proper.

The Seventh Circuit has not only approved screening devices, but
actively advocates them.1OT In Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic
ManufacturingCo., 108 the Federal Circuit held that the Seventh Circuit had not made screening the "sinequa non of establishing the nonexistence of the presumed fact that confidences have been shared,"
and allowed testimonial evidence to rebut the presumption of shared
confidences even absent the erection of an ethical wall.109 In Maning
v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar and Allen,11o the Sixth Circuit has
adopted the Seventh Circuit Schiessle testill and endorsed the use of
screening procedures to rebut the second presumption of shared
confidences.
The Eighth Circuit has not been so flexible regarding the first presumption. "[Tihe law in the Eighth circuit... [is] that the attorneyclient relationship raises an irrefutable presumption" that clients
have disclosed confidences to their attorneys, and that the attorney
104. See Craig A. Peterson, Rebuttable Presumptions and Intra-FirmScreening: The
New Seventh CircuitApproach to Vicarious Disqualificationof Litigation Counsel, 59 NoTRE DAi- L. REv. 399 (1984).
105. 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983).
106. The Nebraska Supreme Court, acknowledging that "[tihere is a strong trend in
the federal courts holding that [the presumption that an infected attorney will
share confidences with the second firm] is rebuttable," specifically considered and
rejected this tripartite analysis without explanation. Nebraska ex rel. Freezer
Servs., Inc. v. Mullen, 235 Neb. 981, 989-90, 458 N.W.2d 245, 251-52 (1990).
107. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983)(stating, "[W]hen an attorney with knowledge of a prior clienfs confidences and secrets changes employment and joins a firm representing an adverse party, specific institutional
mechanisms must be in place to ensure that information is not shared with members of the new firm, even if inadvertently.").
108. 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(applying 7th Circuit law).
109. Id. at 1580.
110. 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988). For two recent articles discussing this case, see
Charles W. Bone & Keith C. Dennan, The Chinese Wall: Conflicts ofInterest and
Imputed Disqualification,25 TENN. B.J. 24,27, 37-38 (1989); Sylvia H. Kapushinski, Note, ScreeningMechanisms:A Rebuttal to Vicarious Disqualification:Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 15 Omo N.U. L. Rlv. 717 (1988).
111. Raab, supra note 17, at 214.
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2
has shared those confidences with his/her associates in the firm.11
However, in Arkansas v. Dean Foods Products Co.,113 the court
seemed to adopt a flexible standard regarding the second presumption, noting that "[rligid rules can be sterile and lacking in universal
application."'114 Dean Foods also explicitly refused to impute an infected attorney's imputed knowledge to co-workers, declaring, "Doubling up on the imputation theory of Canon 4 in this case would be
logically unjustifiable-an attorney] could not impart knowledge he
did not have."115 The Hallmark court also suggested that it would be
open to the use of a screening device, noting that one reason for upholding disqualification in that case was that:

[The subsequent firm] did not build a 'Chinese Wall' and [the infected attorney] was not 'screened off' when he joined the new firm.... Because no 'Chinese Wall' was erected, and because the facts in this action give rise to the
reasonable possibility of specifically identifiable improprieties, a reasonable
would see an impropriety in the continued participation of the law
person
1 6
firm. 3

The Eleventh Circuit, in Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,117
implied that the first presumption of confidences shared by the client
to his/her attorney was rebuttable, although the standard for establishing that no confidences were shared would be very high.118
Although the court found that the challenged attorney would have to
be disqualified, it declined to disqualify the entire firm, noting that the
112. Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 516, 519 n.1 (W.D.
Mo. 1985). But see EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
where the Federal Circuit interpreted Eighth Circuit law to support the proposition that this presumption is rebuttable:
The precise rule on disqualification applied in the Eighth Circuit ... is
not clear but we are satisfied that that Circuit would not be less solicitous of client confidentiality than the general weight of authority which
is that.., there is a presumption (in the situation of a private lawyer's
"changing sides") that confidential disclosures passed to the challenged
lawyer, but that presumption is rebuttable.
Id. at 1461 (emphasis added).
113. 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled on issue of appealabilitysub nom. In re
Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980).
114. Id. at 383.
115. Id. at 387.
116. Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 516, 521 (W.D. Mo.
1985). See also Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1333 (8th Cir. 1990)(holding
in a criminal prosecution, where the defendant claimed a conflict with the Attorney General, that "a screening mechanism or Chinese Wall could be implemented
to avoid disqualifying the entire Attorney General's office." The court also cited
with approval several academic commentaries advocating the use of screening to
avoid disqualification.).
117. 847 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1988).
118. Id. at 729 (stating "[Blecause [the attorney] actually represented [the client seeking disqualification], he is charged with the virtually unrebuttable presumption
that he has received confidential information from the company.")(second emphasis added).
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infected attorney had "been screened from all involvement in this litigation119 and citing with approval the Seventh Circuit Schiessle

decision.' 20

B. State Courts
Several states have codified the rebuttability of the presumptions
underlying disqualification in their ethical guidelines for the legal pro22
fession.12' Michigan allows both presumptions to be rebutted.1
Thus, in order to avoid disqualification, an infected attorney can prove
that he/she did not acquire actual information adverse to the former
client,' 2 3 or the firm can institute the prescribed screening procedures
to rebut the presumption that the confidential information will be

shared with the second firm.12 4 Illinois likewise allows for both pre-

sumptions to be rebutted, either by testimonial evidence regarding the
challenged attorney's lack of relevant information acquired while at
119. Id. at 732.
120. Id. at 732 n.11.
121. For a general discussion of state rules regarding disqualification, see M. Peter
Moser, Chinese Walls: A Means ofAvoiding Law Firm DisqualificationWhen a
PersonallyDisqualifiedLawyer Joinsthe Firm, 3 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmCS 399, 410413 and accompanying notes (1990),
122. Rule 1.09(b) of the MhcoGA RuLEs'OF PRoFEssoNAL CoNDucT (1990) allows the

first presumption to be rebutted:
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client,
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by
rule 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter;
unless the former client consents after consultation.
If the attorney has actually acquired confidential information, Rule 1.10(b)
provides:
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not
knowingly represent a person in the same or substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was associated,
had previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter,
unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
See also State Bar of Michigan, Op. R-4 (1989)(law firm may avoid disqualification when joined by lawyer who worked on opposite side of cases currently in
new firm as long as institutional screening is employed in accordance with Michigan Rule 1.10(b)).
123. Peter M. Kempel, Annual Survey offMichigan Law, June 1, 1990 - May 31, 1991:
ProfessionalResponsibility, 38 WAYNE L. Rlv 1155, 1158 (1992).
124. Moser, supra note 121, at 411.
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the prior firm, or by the implementation of a screen to avoid the com-

munication of that information to the subsequent firm.12 5

Other states have held the second presumption rebuttable by allowing the use of screening devices. The Oregon Revised Code of Professional Responsibility permits a law firm to accept or continue
representation of a client when a lawyer entering the firm is disqualified, as long as "the personally disqualified lawyer is screened from
any form of participation or representation in the matter.126 In order
to assure the effectiveness of the screening, both the personally disqualified lawyer and another firm lawyer must serve affidavits of compliance on the lawyer's former firm at the outset and at the conclusion
of the representation.12 7 The PennsylvaniaRules of ProfessionalCon125. ILINOis RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.10 (1994) reads in pertinent

part:
(b) when a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not represent a person in a matter that the firm knows or reasonably should
know is the same or substantially related to a matter in which the newly
associated lawyer, or a firm with which that lawyer was associated, had
previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to
that person unless:
(1) the newly associated lawyer has no information protected by Rule
1.6 or Rule 1.9 that is material to the matter; or
(2) the newly associated lawyer is screened from any participation in
the matter....
(e) for purposes of Rule 1.10, Rule 1.11 and Rule 1.12, a lawyer in a firm
will be deemed to have been screened from any participation in a matter
if:
(1) the lawyer has been isolated from confidences, secrets, and material knowledge concerning the matter;
(2) the lawyer has been isolated from all contact with the client or
any agent, officer, or employee of the client and any witness for or
against the client;
(3) the lawyer and the firm have been precluded from discussing the
matter with each other; and
(4) the firm has taken affirmative steps to accomplish the foregoing.
126. OREGXON REVISED CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(F)
(1989)[hereinafter Oregon Code]. Oregon Code DR 5-105(d) states the general
rule:
Except as permitted in subsections (e) and (f), if a lawyer is required to
decline or withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule other
than DR 2-110(b)(3), no affiliate of the lawyer may accept or continue
such employment.
Oregon Code DR 5-105(G) provides: An "affiliate" defined to include "a partner,
associate, or of counsel lawyer, and any lawyer working for another lawyer as an

employee, independent contractor or otherwise."
127. Oregon Code DR 5-105(f) expresses the affidavit requirements and excuses inadvertent violations as follows:
In order to ensure such screening(1) The personally disqualified lawyer shall serve on the lawyer's former law firm or office an affidavit attesting that during the period of
the lawyer's disqualification the personally disqualified lawyer will
not participate in any manner in the matter or the representation
and will not discuss the matter or the representation with any affili-
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duct allow the firm to avoid disqualification if (1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from participation in the matter, (2) the disqualified
lawyer receives no part of the fees and (3) the affected opposing party
is given written notice so it can ensure compliance.128 The Tennessee
Supreme Court Board of Professional Responsibility applies the threestep analysis adopted by the Seventh Circuit.129 In a formal opinion,
the board stated that screening avoids disqualification of an entire
firm in a case where that firm is joined by a lawyer with knowledge of
confidential information of opponents of the new firm which the lawyer gained in a prior association.1 3 0
ated lawyer; and the personally disqualified lawyer shall serve,
promptly upon final disposition of the matter or upon expiration of
the period of the personal disqualification, which ever occurs sooner,
a further affidavit describing the lawyer's actual compliance with
these undertakings.
(2) At least one affiliated lawyer shall serve on the same law firm or
office an affidavit attesting that all affiliated lawyers are aware of the
requirement that the personally disqualified lawyer be screened from
participating in or discussing the matter or the representation and
describing the procedures being taken to screen the personally disqualified lawyer; and at least one affiliated lawyer shall serve,
promptly upon final disposition of the matter or upon expiration of
the period of personal disqualification, whichever occurs sooner, a
further affidavit describing the actual compliance by the affiliated
lawyers with the procedures for screening the personally disqualified
lawyer.
(3) No violation of DR 5-105(e) or of the requirements of DR 5-105(f)
shall be deemed to have occurred if the personally disqualified lawyer
is unaware and has no reason to know that the lawyer's affiliates
have accepted employment with respect to a matter which would require the making and service of such affidavits and if all affiliated
lawyers having knowledge of the accepted employment are unaware
and have no reason to know of the disqualification.
128. Rule 1.10(b) of the PENsYLvAIA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuar (1994)

provides:
When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that lawyer or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had
previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to
that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate client to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
The comment to the Rule omits any explanation of the measures to be applied to
assure effective screening. PFN.smyLVANuA Ruus OF PROFESSIONAL CoiNucr Rule

1.10(b) cmt. (1988).
129. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983).
130. Tenn. Sup. Ct. Bd. of Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 89-F-118. For an
extensive discussion of the Tennessee standard, see Bone & Denan, supra note
110.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:137

Many jurisdictions that do not have ethical rules specifically allowing for one or both the presumptions to be rebutted have nevertheless allowed one or both presumptions to be rebutted. The Florida
courts have held the first presumption of confidences shared with a
challenged attorney at the first firm to be irrebuttable, but will not
exercise the second presumption against a subsequent firm unless the
tainted attorney has actual knowledge of the relevant case. 131 The
for this proposition in the Rules Regulating the
courts found13support
2
FloridaBar.
The Kansas Supreme Court recently held that disqualification can
be avoided if the first presumption can be rebutted through testimonial evidence to show that no sharing of material, confidential information took place while the challenged attorney was associated with
the first firm.1 3 3 While the Kansas court has not expressly ruled on

whether the second presumption is rebuttable, it has disapproved the
litigation agree that
use of screening devices unless all parties to the
13 4
such a solution is appropriate in a given case.
The Washington Court of Appeals has recognized the propriety of
screening devices to rebut the second presumption.1 3 5 The court set
forth guidelines in establishing appropriate screening measures for
law firms facing a conflict by one of its members. A firm, upon perceiving a possible disqualification of one of its attorneys, should establish
and document a policy of (1) excluding the attorney from participation
in the cases, (2) denying the attorney access to the files, (3) excluding
the attorney from all fees earned from those cases, (4) refraining from
discussing the case in the attorney's presence, and (5) precluding the
attorney from disclosing any information about the opposing party or
about the public agency which would not otherwise be available to the

131. Nissan Motor Corp. v. Orozco, 595 So.2d 240, 242-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)(relying on Graham v. Wyeth Lab. Div. of Am. Home Prods. Corp., 906 F.2d 1419
(10th Cir. 1990)).
132. Id. (interpreting RuLEs REGULATING TnE FLORIDA BAR 4-1.9 and 4-1.10). For a
detailed analysis of the disqualification rules as they operate in Florida, see
Adele I. Stone, ProfessionalEthics: 1993 Leading Cases and Significant Developments in FloridaLaw, 18 NovA L. REv. 597 (1993).
133. Parker v. VolkswagenwerkA.G., 781 P.2d 1099, 1105 (Kan. 1989)(remanding motion to disqualify to trial court for full evidentiary hearing as to whether confidential information was actually shared with challenged attorney while he was
associated with prior firm).
134. Id. at 1106-07. For a discussion of the series of cases dealing with motions to
disqualify in Kansas and the import of the Courts decision in Parker,see Mark F.
Anderson, Motions to Disqualify Opposing Counsel, 30 WASHBuRN L.J. 238
(1991).
135. City of Hoquiam v. Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 628 P.2d 1314, 1322
(Wash. App. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 646 P.2d 129 (Wash. 1982).
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public.l36 Other states have 37
joined the trend in allowing the second
presumption to be rebutted.1
As the foregoing illustrates, the majority of states, either through
promulgation of rules governing the professional conduct of the bar in
their jurisdictions or through the operation of case law in which courts
exercise their power to govern the behavior of the attorneys which
practice before them, allow rebuttal of the first presumption, the second presumption, or both. The Nebraska rule announced in FirsTier,
however, makes both presumptions irrebuttable.
V. HOW THE NEBRASKA RULE IS UNIQUE
The Nebraska Supreme Court in FirsTierdeclared the "bright line
rule" that:
An attorney must avoid the present representation of a cause against a client
of a law firm with which he or she was formerly associated, and which cause
involves a subject matter which is the same as or substantially related to that
handled by
the former firm while the present attorney was associated with
that firm. 13 8

The court adopted this rule even though the challenged attorney
had proven that he had no actual knowledge of the matter currently at
issue.' 3 9 Thus, the court held the first presumption irrebuttable.14 0
An attorney can do nothing to prevent being tainted by information
given by a client to one of his/her associates.141
The court did not stop at imputing knowledge to the challenged
attorney. It then disqualified the challenged attorney's entire firm,
even though none of the other members of the firm were personally
tainted by the prior matter.14 2 The court had laid the foundation for
this approach in FreezerServices, where it declared in dicta that "[iln
some factual situations the second firm might be disqualified by reason of a double presumption of shared confidences which works to im136. Id. at 1322. For a complete discussion of this holding and its applicability in the
Washington courts, see Bryce E. Brown & Christopher M. Herriges, Comment,
Dovetailing the "Chinese Wall" Defense with the Rules of Professional ConductWashington Should Finish What It Has Started, 26 GoNz. L. REy. 569 (1991)(advocating a change in the WashingtonRules of ProfessionalConduct to codify and
formalize the use of screens to rebut the presumption of shared confidences).
137. See, e.g., Exparte Taylor Coal Co., Inc., 401 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1981)(finding no automatic disqualification of lawyer or his firm, even when "substantial relationship"
to prior matter is found); Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720 (Minn.
1983)(holding that law firm not disqualified when the presumption of sharing of
confidences by the tainted lawyer had been rebutted).
138. Nebraska ex rel. FirsTier Bank, NA. v. Buckley, 244 Neb. 36, 45, 503 N.W.2d
838, 844 (1993).
139. Id. at 39-40, 503 N.W.2d at 841.
140. Id. at 45, 503 N.W.2d at 844.
141. Id. at 39-40, 503 N.W.2d at 841.
142. Id. at 46, 503 N.W.2d at 845.
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pute disqualification to that firm."143 Immediately after that
declaration the court included the following citation sentence: "But see
Panduit Corp.,144... (under certain facts, the double imputation theory would invent conflicts where none exist)."145 The court's use of
"but see" as an introductory signal gives particular insight to the
court's position, since the Bluebook explains that "But see" is to be
used when "cited authority clearly supports a proposition contrary to
the main proposition."146 If Panduit Corp., which expressly rejects
double imputation, is an authority that "clearly supports a proposition
contrary to the stated proposition," the court's position must be that
double imputation is appropriate. The court, therefore, endorsed
double imputation in Freezer Services, and then gave force to that
dicta in FirsTier. When read together, Freezer Services and FirsTier
clearly establish that, in Nebraska, neither presumption is rebuttable.
No other court has endorsed this double imputation.14 7 The Second Circuit was one of the first courts to consider the issue in Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.Chrysler Motors Corp.148 There the court
refused to disqualify a firm when one of its attorneys had been an associate with opposing counsel's eighty member firm, since there was
no basis for assuming that all client confidences revealed to members
49
of the firm had in actuality been revealed to the tainted attorney.1
The court held that "[tlo apply the remedy when there is no realistic
chance that confidences were disclosed would go far beyond the purpose of those decisions" granting disqualification.150 Since Silver
Chrysler, double imputation has been rejected virtually out of hand by
the courts that have considered it, with opinions declaring that,
"[s]uch a rule would be unsound logically and indefensible practically,"'5' and that "resort to so drastic a measure would not only be
143. Nebraska ex rel. Freezer Servs., Inc. v. Mullen, 235 Neb. 981, 988, 458 N.W.2d
245, 250 (1990).
144. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(applying 7th Circuit law).
145. Nebraska ex rel. Freezer Servs., Inc. v. Mullen, 235 Neb. 981, 988, 458 N.W.2d
245, 250 (1990).
146. The Bluebook: a Uniform System of Citation Rule 1.2(c)(15th rev. ed. 6th prtg.
1992)(emphasis in original).
147. See supra Part IV. See also H. Liebman, The ChangingLaw of Disqualification:
The Role of Presumptionand Policy, 73 Nw. U. L. RBv. 996, 1000 n.18 (1979)(noting that '[tihe courts have not gone so far as to adopt a 'double imputation' theory"); Moser, supra note 121, at 405 (stating that no court has adopted double
imputation); Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARv.L. REv. 1244, 1357 (1981).
148. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 757.
151. American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971).
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unwise, but would also set disturbing precedent."l52 Every other jurisdiction allows some flexibility in the operation of one or both of the
presumptions.' 53 The Nebraska Supreme Court can draw support for
holding either one of the presumptions alone as irrebuttable, but it
stands alone in the proposition that there is no escape from both presumptions working together.
The breadth of this rule can best be understood by considering a
factual situation in which it would operate. Suppose attorney Cornelius Husker begins his career in Bugeater & Associates law firm.
Bugeater & Associates represents Free Shoes University (FSU), a
large corporate defendant, in a claim asserted by Nebraska Collegiate
Apparel Association (NCAA). While at Bugeater & Associates, Cornelius will have knowledge regarding FSU's case, in addition to potentially thousands of other clients and matters, imputed to him. This
imputation is irrebuttable, even though it is not possible that Cornelius worked on or even knew about all of these matters. After a few
years, Cornelius decides he wants to strike out on his own. He joins
forces with two other attorneys, Jay Hawk and Ralph E. Buffalo, who
are themselves leaving large firms. All three attorneys form Big
Eight, P.C. All members of Big Eight will now be prohibited from representing NCAA, or any client with a claim against FSU that may be
152. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1578 (1984). See also

Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1333 (8th Cir. 1990)(refusing to disqualify
entire Attorney General's Office by reimputing imputed knowledge of tainted
lawyer); Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 387 (8th Cir. 1979),
overruled on issue of appealabilitysub nom. In re Multi-Piece Rim Prod. Liab.
Litig., 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980)(stating that "[dloubling up on the imputation
theory... would be logically unjustiflable-the challenged attorney] could not
impart knowledge he did not have. It would also be ethically unjustifiable, requiring the invention of actual conflict where none exists."); Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod. Corp., 691 F. Supp. 109, 119-20 (N.D. Ill. 1988)(refusing
to disqualify entire law firm, even though one of its members was subject to disqualification on the basis of imputed knowledge from prior association with opposing counsel's firm); U.S. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Const. Corp., 637 F. Supp.
1556, 1566 (W.D. Wash. 1986)(refusing to disqualify firm based on imputed
knowledge of an associated attorney when the tainted attorney was "not likely to
have retained more than a distant recollection of [the] former client's affairs"); In
re Farmers Co-Op of Ark. and Okla., Inc., 53 B.R. 600, 604 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
1985)(finding attorney's disqualification on the basis of imputed knowledge not
imputed to entire firm); Richers v. Marsh & McLennan Group Assoc., 459 N.W.2d
478, 482 (Iowa 1990)(finding no appearance of impropriety problem with allowing
associate of tainted attorney to continue representation when the tainted attorney is charged only with imputed knowledge); Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344,
349 (Wyo. 1988)(stating "[We chose not to carry the irrebuttable presumption
any further than necessary, and.., we would not adopt a second-stage irrebuttable presumption in cases involving imputed knowledge."); Chambers v. Superior Court of Shasta County, 121 Cal. App. 3d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)(refusing to
reimpute knowledge of a former government attorney to her private firm).
153. See supra Part IV.
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substantially similar to the case of FSU v. NCAA. All of the attorneys
at Big Eight will have knowledge of all of the clients of Bugeater &
Associates (as well as Jay and Ralph's prior firms) imputed to them.
Suppose further that Big Eight flourishes and decides to hire a
fourth attorney, Tex S. Longhorn. Tex represents NCAA. FSU will
then be able to bring a disqualification motion against Tex on the
grounds that Cornelius' imputed knowledge of FSU's case has been
passed to Tex by virtue of their association.
Let us now assume that instead of hiring Tex at Big Eight, Ralph
wishes to leave Big Eight to form a third law firm (Dirty Dozen, P.C.)
with Tex. The Nebraska rule would imply that Tex would still be vulnerable to a motion to disqualify because Ralph's imputed knowledge
(acquired from Cornelius, who acquired the imputed knowledge from
Bugeater & Associates) would now be imputed to Tex. The problems
created by such a rule are obviously myriad.
VI. WHY THE NEBRASKA RULE IS UNWISE
A. Harm to the Legal Profession
The impact of this new "bright line rule" on attorneys practicing in
Nebraska is hard to overstate. An attorney now must take care, not
only to avoid conflicts that he/she knows of, but conflicts about which
he/she is unaware. These hidden conflicts can arise from matters that
a former associate in a previous firm handled, from matters a current
associate dealt with during a prior association with another firm, or
from matters imputed to a current associate from a former associate.
Thus, it is no longer enough to examine a firm's client list before accepting employment. An attorney must now also examine the client
lists of all firms any member of the current firm was associated with in
the past. Given the fact that a client's identity can, in some situations, be considered confidential,154 and an attorney's general reluctance to reveal the identity of their clients as a matter of principle,155
this task, Herculean to begin with, becomes impossible. The only way
for a firm to protect itself from a motion to disqualify is to refrain from
associating with any attorney with any past relationship with another
practice in Nebraska.156 This severely circumscribes the mobility of
attorneys. What firm will consider a new hire when it will open the
154. See, e.g., United States v. Simms, 845 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1988).
155. See, e.g., 8 JoHN HENRY WIGMOR, EvmENcE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2291,

at 545 (McNaughton rev. 1961)(stating, "In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the
legal advisors must be removed; hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent.").
156. Recall, however, that the Nebraska rule operated against a non-Nebraska firm in
Nebraska ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Hickman, 245 Neb. 247, 512 N.W.2d 374
(1994).
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firm up to challenges that are unforeseeable and unpreventable? It
will also inhibit the dissemination of new innovations in the law since
attorneys with new areas of expertise or experience cannot join a firm.
"[A] per se disqualification rule inhibits ... an attorney's ability to
move between firms, and a law firm's ability to hire qualified attorneys while retaining its client base."157
Those most severely impacted by this new and unprecedented approach to conflict of interest will not, however, be senior partners com8
fortably established in a specific practice area in a particular firm.'5
This rule is most pernicious because it falls most harshly on those
with the least power to prevent its effects-young associates, law
clerks and secretarial and clerical staff.
The competition to secure legal employment has never been so
fierce.'59 Recent law school graduates and young associates find
themselves in a competitive "buyer's market," in which employment
opportunities are limited.160 A harsh rule allowing double imputation
to operate against a firm that hires an attorney from a competing firm
restricts a young attorney's opportunities even more severely. As the
Silver Chrysler court put it, "IThe courts must be cautious not to...
unnecessarily circumscribe the career of a young professional. The
Canons may not be used to engross legal talent or to obtain the advantages of an implied restrictive covenant that would be of doubtful validity in any other employment situation."'16 The Supreme Court of
New Jersey has noted that irrebuttable presumptions harm "the mobility of young attorneys and what they sometimes look upon as their
serf-like status."162 A rigid rule of total disqualification forces graduates to become overcommitted to their initial employer because it prevents them from leaving the firm with which they are first employed
and being retained by clients seeking their specialized services.' 6 3 Ac157. Brown & Herriges, supra note 136, at 573.
158. The application of the rule to law firm mergers, however, as was done in Nebraska ex rel. Firstier Bank, NA. v. Buckley, 244 Neb. 36, 503 N.W.2d 838
(1993), does have the potential to circumscribe the career of the most established
practitioner.
159. See Jordan, supra note 7, at 1. See also Janie MaGruder, New Competitive Era
Awaits State's Law School Graduates,Amz. Bus. GAZ., June 9, 1994, at 23 (finding too many law school graduates chasing too few jobs); Jacquelyn J. Burt, How
Law Schools Should Cope with a ChangingMarket, N.J.L.J., September 12,1994,
at 10 (stating law school graduates facing a "tighter economic market").
160. Susan C. Thomson, Bar Wars: Law GraduatesFacing Trials in Job Market, ST.
Louis POST-DIsPATCH, July 17, 1994, at 8A.
161. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 583
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
162. Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 416 A.2d 852,860-62 (N.J. 1980Xupholding disqualification on the grounds that the challenged attorney had acquired actual confidences of the prior client).
163. Note, UnchangingRules in ChangingTimes: The CanonsofEthics andIntra-firm
Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058 (1964).
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cording to Geoffry C. Hazard, 164 this bright line rule "could cause
1 65
firms not to hire anyone having previously worked at another firm."

The net effect is that young attorneys have one chance to secure satisfying employment within the state of Nebraska. Once they have been
associated with a firm, they are forever burdened with an irrebuttable
presumption of knowledge, the extent of which is impossible for an
associate to determine, and the reach of which extends not only to the
individual, but also against any attorney with whom they associate for
the rest of their careers. This choice is forced upon young attorneys
when they are most vulnerable and lacking any bargaining power or
negotiating experience-when they seek their first job.
This rule has all the effects of disfavored restrictive covenants not
to compete with one's former employer: it reduces the economic mobility of employees and thus reduces their personal freedom to follow
their own interests. It also serves to diminish competition by intimidating associates of a firm from striking out on their own to compete
with the prior firm. Any associate who leaves his/her initial employer
will be forever vulnerable to retaliation from that firm in the form of a
motion to disqualify.
Moreover, a rigid rule of imputed disqualification is particularly
inappropriate in a state like Nebraska, where, because of a small population, a small number of law firms handle much of the area's substantial commercial practice.16 6 An attorney seeking to leave one of
these firms will find himself/herself effectively prohibited from practicing in his/her area of expertise since most potential clients will have
had some dealings in opposition with the former firm. The Nebraska
rule serves to severely circumscribe the employment opportunities of
lawyers, with the burden falling most heavily on those least able to
bear it-young attorneys just starting their careers.
Law school graduates are not the only ones who will have their
legal careers severely circumscribed because of Nebraska's overly
rigid approach to conflict of interest. Law students have already been
affected by the rule. In Advisory Opinion 94-4, the Advisory Committee appointed by the Nebraska Supreme Court for the Nebraska State
Bar Association concluded, "It is the opinion of the Committee that the
'bright line' rule is intended by the Court to apply not only to lawyers
or former lawyers, but also to law clerks, paralegals, secretaries or
other ancillary staff members who change law firms."16 7 The reaction
164. Professor of Law at University of Pennsylvania, Professor Emeritus at Yale Law
School, and a reporter for the Kutak Commission (authors of the ABA Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct).
165. Court Narrows Scope of Bright Line Rule, NEB. ST. B. Ass'N NEWS (Neb. St. B.
Ass'n), Aug., 1994, 1, at 1 [hereinafter NEB. ST. B. AsS'N NEws].
166. See Jordon, supra note 7, at 1 (discussing competition among law graduates).
167. Neb. St. B. Ass'n Advisory Committee, Advisory Op. 94-4 at 5-6 (1994)[hereinafter Advisory Committee Op. 94-4].
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of the state bar has been swift. When the Creighton case was published in the early summer of 1994, one Lincoln law firm immediately
suspended two second-year summer clerks who had clerked for other
Lincoln law firms.168 One Nebraska law firm has terminated its
clerking program altogether because of the potential for conflicts.169
The harm worked by this rule on law students is immediately apparent. One of the most effective, and in some cases the only, way for
an aspiring attorney to gain experience in serving the needs of clients,
confidence in the application of legal principles and an understanding
of the day-to-day operation of the practice of law is through a summer
associate or law clerk program. A law clerk gains the benefits of a
legal apprenticeship that provides him/her with a ready source of professional mentorship and valuable contacts that serve the student
long after graduation. It is through these summer clerkships that permanent associate positions are normally acquired. 170 If a permanent
position is not secured at the firm where the student is employed, this
type of practical educational experience has become almost de rigueur
in building a resum6 to secure permanent employment elsewhere. Additionally, because of the demands of attending law school, these positions are one of the few forms of well-paid employment a law student
can secure. Denying students this kind of work not only increases the
financial burden of attending law school, a burden that falls heavily on
students of poor or moderate means, but also increases the social and
economic elitism of the profession, a criticism to which the bar is already subject.17 1
The folly of such an approach was recognized in Silver Chrysler,
one of the earliest decisions regarding imputed disqualification:
[I]t has now become the practice to hire for summer work (usually between
their second and third years at law school) a substantial number of law students. These "summer associates" most frequently perform tasks assigned to
them by supervising associates or partners. Many of the summer students do

not return to the same firms with which they have been associated.... [Ilt

would be absurd to conclude that immediately upon their entry on duty they
become the recipients of knowledge as to the name of all the firm's clients, the
contents of all files relating to such clients, and all confidential disclosures by

client officers or employees to any lawyer in the firm. Obviously such legal
osmosis does not occur. The mere recital of such a proposition should be selfrefuting. And a rational interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsi-

168. Letter from Lawrence Raful, Dean of the Creighton University School of Law,
Harvey S. Perlman, Dean of the University of Nebraska College of Law, and
Steven Kalish, Margaret Larson Professor of Legal Ethics at the UNL College of
Law to the Honorable William Hastings, Chief Justice, Nebraska Supreme Court
(May 27, 1994)(on file with author)[hereinafter Letter to Chief Justice Hastings].

169. DeBorah Lewis, Conflict ofInterestBrightLine is Limit on Students'Horizons, 29
NEBRAsKA TRANscRnTr (Univ. of Neb. C. of L.)(Spring, 1995)(manuscript on file
with author).
170. NEB. ST. B. Ass'N NEws, supra note 165, at 2.
171. HAzARD ET AL., supra note 17, at 855-84.
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bility does not call for disqualification on the basis of such an unrealistic per172
ception of the practice of law in large firms.

Additionally, there is less danger that a law clerk's knowledge of
client matters will pose a danger to that client's cause. Student law
clerks will rarely be privy to the same kind of confidential information
as attorneys are, and because of their inexperience, clerks will be less
the significance of any information they do
able to apprehend
3
acquire.17
Additionally, applying the bright line rule to law clerks will contribute to a continuing source of concern to the Nebraska bar: the
problem of "brain drain." The most talented Nebraska law school
graduates will likely accept employment as law clerks while they are
students and then flee the state upon graduation for a jurisdiction
where clerking experience is an attribute, rather than a liability. In
fact, this is the intention currently announced by many students at
the University of Nebraska College of Law. 1 74 It is certainly in the
best interest of the profession as well as the courts and the public to
encourage legal talent to remain in the state-particularly when the
state has invested in students' education by funding a College of Law
at the state institution. This rule creates incentives that will deprive
Nebraska taxpayers of a significant return on that investment.
The Nebraska rule is even more harsh as applied to non-lawyer
personnel. Even in jurisdictions that hold one of the two presumptions to be irrebuttable, the knowledge of confidential information by
the nonlawyer does not and will not generally "disqualify the employing law firm from representation so long as adequate screening measures are undertaken which prevent such knowledge from "tainting"
the rest of the firm."'175 However, in Creighton,the court extended the
duel irrebuttable presumptions to a non-attorney, declaring "[W]e refuse to entertain the notion that exchanges of confidences were not
made by this nonlawyer.'" 7 6 However, other courts that have considered the issue of disqualification based on tainted ancillary staff have
emphasized that law firms rely on experienced legal assistance. One
court concluded that if a rule of imputed disqualification were applied
to paralegal staff it would be impossible to maintain and staff law firm
offices. 177 The American Bar Association has recommended that non172. Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir.
1975).
173. Letter to Chief Justice Hastings, supra note 168, at 3.
174. Lewis, supra note 169.
175. McLaughlin et al., supra note 32, at 833 (discussing this proposition in general
and citing rulings from California, Maryland, and ABA Informal Opinions).
176. Nebraska ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Hickman, 245 Neb. 247, 253, 512 N.W.2d
374, 378 (1994). See also Advisory Committee Op. 94-4, supra note 167, at 5-6.
177. Herron v. Jones, 637 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Ark. 1982).
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lawyer personnel be exempted from stringent conflict of interest rules,
explaining that:
It is important that nonlawyer employees have as much mobility in employment opportunity as possible consistent with the protection of clients' interests. To so limit employment opportunities that some nonlawyers trained to
work with law firms might be required to leave the careers for which they are

trained would diserve clients as well as the legal profession. Accordingly, any
restrictions on the nonlawyer's employment should be held
to the minimum
17 8
necessary to protect confidentiality of client information.

One commentator has noted that this treatment of paralegal staff
smacks of elitism, concluding that "court[s] are unwilling to jeopardize
the availability of [experienced staff] by disqualifying a firm that hired
a mere secretary.'l79 However, the harm worked on ancillary staff by
treating them like attorneys for the purpose of disqualification is unduly harsh. If an attorney's choices for employment are limited by
this overly rigid rule, staff members are affected even more severely.
The governance system of most law firms is such that attorneys are
the ones who make significant employment decisions. Staff members
have significantly less value to and consequently less bargaining
power with their employers than do attorneys. This position of weakness is made much more severe by the fact that, with the advent of
double imputation for staff persons, a clerical employee can no longer
go out and offer his/her services to another employer. The skills that
make an experienced, competent legal secretary employable are the
very abilities that prevent him/her from finding a position with another employer law firm who will value those skills. Many firms will
doubtless feel freer to pursue an unpopular policy within the firm, because, with the advent of double imputation as applied to staff members, secretaries and paralegals won't be likely to quit over the matter.
Depriving nonlawyers of the choice of moving to another firm if they
are unhappy with their current employers is too great a price to de178. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 88-1526
(1988). See also Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enter., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill.
1985)(refusing to disqualify law firm representing defendant because a secretary
hired from the firm representing the plaintiff was properly shielded from any
involvement in the case); Herron v. Jones, 637 S.W.2d 569 (Ark. 1982)(denying
disqualification where no disclosure of confidential information by secretary occurred); Virginia State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics Op. No. 754 (1986)(stating
that a lawyer may continue in case so long as his/her secretary is required to
maintain confidences acquired during former employment with opposing counsel); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Ops. 80-77, 80-119 (1980)(allowing screening procedures to prevent disclosure of confidences to secretary). But see New Jersey Op.
546 (1984Xstating the presumption that confidences have been exchanged is ir-

rebuttable, and disqualification automatic when staff member has actual knowledge of confidences).
179. Stephen E. Kalish, The Side.Switching Staff Person in a Law Firm: UncomplimentaryAssumptions and an Ethics Curtain,15 HInmE L. Rlv. 35, 48 (1991).
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mand in pursuit of a rule that is not evoked to protect the actual needs
of the public.l80

The fact that this rule provides attorneys with a source of captive
labor, however, does not mean it is a boon for attorneys as applied to
secretarial and clerical staff. The potential for conflicts of interest in
small towns could limit a firm's ability to recruit qualified personnel.' 8 ' There will be a limited pool of qualified applicants for support
positions in smaller communities. That pool will be even more severely circumscribed when all applicants with prior experience in
legal work cannot be considered. This approach, however, will be the
only safe alternative because a secretary, even less often than an attorney, will have no way of knowing about all matters the firm handled. There has been bitter complaint by attorneys in states that
require disqualification when the challenged staff member has actual
knowledge and is not allowed to be screened.18 2 The Nebraska rule
however, is even more unforgiving. Staff members with a prior association with opposing counsel's firm will leave their new firms vulnerable to a motion to disqualify, regardless of the staff member's actual
knowledge of client confidences. This rule threatens to deprive the bar
of qualified support staff, an invaluable resource to both practitioners
and their clients.
Perhaps the greatest harm worked on the legal profession by the
Nebraska Supreme Court's interpretation of the two presumptions as
irrebuttable is the damage it does to the public's perception of the profession. This is the primary interest that motivated the court in laying down this inflexible rule. In FirsTier,the court declared,
[A] very real and critical consideration is the perception that the public has of
the legal profession generally. It is difficult to explain to an individual client
how an attorney who was once associated with a firm can leave that firm and
now bring suit against that client involving the same or substantially similar
subject matter formerly handled by his or her prior firm. Resort to affidavits
stating that "I didn't look at the file' or asserting the existence of Chinese
that client and do little or nothing to erase the
walls are of little consolation18to
3
appearance of impropriety.

The court then went on to pronounce its "bright line rule," rationalizing it as necessary "to properly preserve not only the actual existence, but also the appearance, of propriety, and to eliminate as nearly
as possible unnecessary and unwarranted criticism of the legal profession."184 As noted above, the "appearance of impropriety" standard,
180. See infra Part VI.C.
181. Aaron M. Grossman, Lawyer Disqualified;Secretary Used to Work for Other Side,
LAWYERS WEEKLY USA, May 23, 1994, at 1, 12.
182. Id.
183. Nebraska ex rel. FirsTier, NA. v. Buckley, 244 Neb. 36, 45, 503 N.W.2d 838, 844
(1993).
184. Id.
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when used to justify disqualification of a firm tainted by an imputed
conflict of interest has been roundly criticized by commentators, the
ABA, and the courts themselves.185 Indeed one commentator has
observed:
If the adversary system's image is relevant, courts arguably should never hear
successive conflict disqualification motions. These often visible motions,
charging unethical conduct, bring matters to public attention that would
otherwise escape notice. Further, the motions ask courts to help clients keep
18 6
secrets, something that in most contexts the public considers distasteful.

While few would agree with the proposition that the courts should
not work to enforce ethical behavior among attorneys, disqualification
motions themselves can create the appearance of impropriety. Many
courts agree that granting disqualification motions where no actual
conflict exists leads to the public perception that the challenged attorney has done something wrong, furthering a perception of attorneys as
unethical creatures who are constantly working to undermine the system.1 8 7 In most instances, such as the facts presented in FirsTierand
Freezer Services, nothing could be further from the truth. No actual
unethical conduct was charged in either case,1 8 8 but the court's disqualification is likely to lead to the public perception that someone did
something wrong. The capricious nature of this rule is compounded by
the fact that courts have allowed for screening mechanisms in banks
and securities firms, even though those professionals, like attorneys,
owe their clients the utmost fiduciary duty.18 9 By allowing the presumptions to be rebutted in one situation and not the other, the court
implies that lawyers are less trustworthy than members of the banking and investment banking communities.o9 0 The Eleventh Circuit
noted an additional problem with using the appearance of impropriety
185. See supra Part H and accompanying notes.
186. Goldberg, supra note 52, at 270.
187. See, e.g., Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 873 (W.D. Mo. 1980)(stating, "[T]he

publicity surrounding this case to date suggests that the public's confidence in

the integrity of our judicial system would be eroded and emasculated by the disqualification of challenged counsel, because such an action would likely be viewed
as a triumph of regimented rule over reason."); Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods.
Co., 605 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled on appealabilitysub norm In re
Multi-Piece Rim Prod. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980)(stating, "Disqualification in spasm reaction to every situation capable of appearing improper to
the jaundiced cynic is as goal-defeating as failure to disqualify in blind disregard

of flagrant conflicts of interest.").

188. Nebraska ex rel. FirsTier Bank, NA. v. Buckley, 244 Neb. 36, 503 N.W.2d 838
(1993); Nebraska ex rel. Freezer Servs., Inc. v. Mullen, 235 Neb. 981, 458 N.W.2d

245 (1990).

189. Varn, supra note 47, at 211-16.
190. Lerner, supra note 17, at 67 (stating, "Lawyers are no less trustworthy than

members of the banking and investment banking communities, and there would
not seem to be a principled reason not to permit the more widespread use of
Screening Devices in the legal community to resolve potential conflicts.").
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standard to disqualify attorneys absent an actual ethical violation
stating it endangers the profession by exposing the tactical nature of
many disqualification motions and thereby increases cynicism about
both the bar and the judiciary.191 The Federal Circuit in Panduit
agreed, cautioning that "judges must exercise caution not to paint
with a broad brush under the misguided belief that coming down on
the side of disqualification raises the standard of legal ethics and the
public's respect. The opposite effects are just as likely-encouragement of vexatious tactics and increased cynicism by the public."192
The Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the -very argument employed by
the Nebraska court, concluding, "Carriage of this imputation-on-animputation to its logical terminus could lead to extreme results in no
way required to maintain public confidence in the bar."193 When the
disqualification is covered in the media, the public only hears that a
law firm committed an ethical impropriety.194 What is lost is that the
advantage gained by the disqualified law firm is imputed, rather than
actual, and inadvertent rather than intentional. The public will likely
see motions to disqualify brought under this rule as petty squabbles
between attorneys that do nothing to further their interests as clients,
while delaying final resolution of a dispute and inflating the attorney's
final bill. They will be right.
B. Harm to the Courts
The new "bright line" rule as articulated by the Nebraska Supreme
Court will do more than harm the perceptions and practical realities
of the bar, however. This rule will also significantly hinder the courts
of Nebraska by subjecting them to increased use of the motion to disqualify as a litigation weapon, requiring acrimonious and time-consuming hearings about the validity of those motions, and raising new
and troubling questions about the conflicts ofjudges themselves, along
with their clerks and their staff.195
In 1984 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia deplored
"[tlhe tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay
proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and
harass and embarrass the opponent."196 The United States Supreme
Court agreed with the court of appeals, characterizing motions to dis191. Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725, 732 (11th Cir. 1988).
192. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir.
1984)(applying 7th Cir. law).
193. American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971).
194. Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 873 (W.D. Mo. 1980). See also Goldberg,
supra note 52, at 262.
195. Letter to Chief Justice Hastings, supra note 168, at 2.
196. Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated
for lack ofjurisdiction,472 U.S. 424 (1985).
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qualify as a "dangerous game."'97 One author described the increasing use of motions to disqualify as a "fifteen-year journey from ethical
equanimity to procedural pandemonium."198 The use of motions to
disqualify is devolving from a drastic measure resorted to only when
one's opponent has committed an egregious ethical violation into just
another weapon in an arsenal of litigation "hard ball." One observer
reports that "[1]awyers have discovered that disqualifying opposing
counsel is a successful trial strategy, capable of creating delay, harassment, additional expense, and perhaps even resulting in the withdrawal of a dangerously competent counsel."19 9
Nebraska's bright line rule does not simply "aid the bar in its coping with situations [where a potential conflict exists]"200 by examining
their own backgrounds for potential conflicts. It encourages Nebraska practitioners to scrupulously examine the background of their
opponents for an area where they might be vulnerable to a motion to
disqualify. Litigators are likely to accept this invitation, because the
motion to disqualify is a powerful weapon. If the disqualification gambit is successful, the opposing party is deprived of the counsel of its
choice and frequently is denied use of any work product generated by
that counsel, since the work cannot be cleaned of a presumptive
taint.2 01 This places the opposition back at "square one" of a matter,
while the successful movant continues the relationship established
197. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985)(quoting Koller v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
198. Goldberg, supra note 52, at 228.
199. Developments in the Law: Conflicts ofInterest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARv. L.
REv. 1244, 1285 (1981). See also Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrum. Co., 689
F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1982)(providing that motions to disqualify "should be
viewed with extreme caution for they can be misused as techniques of harassment"); Ellsworth A. Von Graafeiland, Lawyers Conflict of Interest-A Judge's
View, 50 N.Y. ST. B. J. 101, 140-41 (1978)(stating motions to disqualify are "common tools of the litigation process, being used.., for purely strategic purposes").
200. Nebraska ex rel. FirsTier Bank, NJ. v. Buckley, 244 Neb. 36, 45, 503 N.W.2d
838, 844 (1993).
201. Courts routinely have held that once a firm is disqualified, no work product from
the tainted firm can pass to the substitute attorney. See, e.g., EZ Paintr Corp. v.
Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984Xprohibiting turnover of work
product prepared by disqualified attorneys because there was danger that work
product contained confidences obtained from plaintiff); Realco Servs. v. Holt, 479
F. Supp. 867, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1979Xpending motion for access, substitute counsel
not permitted access to work product of disqualified attorney because disqualified
attorney many have acquired and used confidential information in work product).
But see First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 205 (7th Cir.
1978)(en ban)(rejecting rule that prohibited substitute counsel access to work
product because penalty would be against blameless client); Black v. Missouri,
492 F. Supp. 848, 871 (W.D. Mo. 1980Xallowing turnover of disqualified attorney's work product to soften impact of client's loss of experienced counsel). See
generally Comment, The Availability of the Work Product ofa DisqualifiedAttorney: What Standard?, 127 U. PA. L. Ray. 1607 (1979).
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with its counsel. Motions to disqualify are also extremely expensive.

by both parties in litigating
One author notes that $130,00020spent
2
such a motion is not uncommon.
If there is strong incentive for litigants to bring motions to disqualify, the motivation for vigorously defending them is even stronger.
The challenged firm has a strong interest in avoiding a motion to disqualify. First, the challenged firm is obligated to oppose the motion on
the grounds that disqualification is not in the best interests of its client. Secondly, a firm will want to protect its ethical reputation, particularly if the firm has not actually done anything improper. Further,
some courts have ordered the disqualified firm to pay the attorney's
20 3
fees to cover the cost of the disqualification motion's prosecution.
All these factors combine to insure that motions to disqualify will be
hard fought, time consuming and expensive exercises, diverting the
resources of the courts, counsel and clients from the substantive issues in a lawsuit.
The court's pronouncement of a per se rule does nothing to lessen
the intensity of a motion to disqualify. It will, however, increase the
number of such motions. It is safe to say that a significant number of
the attorneys currently practicing in Nebraska, if not the vast majority, have had some prior experience with another firm, or are associated with an attorney who has had experience at another firm, or
employ a non-lawyer with a former relationship with another firm.
Since the extent or nature of the conflicts is virtually impossible to
predict, and since an opponent has every incentive to search for a conflict with the advantage of knowing what the source of the conflict is,
this rule seems virtually to assure that the Nebraska courts will be
forced to deal with an increase in both the number and acrimony of
motions to disqualify.
The prediction that this rule will increase the number of disqualification motions is borne out by the fact that one firm, McGrath, North,
is involved in two of the three cases considered herein. 20 4 It would be
reasonable to conclude that, subjected to disqualification in the
Freezer Services case, McGrath, North decided to turn the weapon
that had wounded it onto an opponent in another matter. This interpretation of McGrath, North's actions is even more reasonable when
considered in light of the fact that motions to disqualify "promote intense professional and personal bitterness." 20 5 Being called dishonest
is never pleasant, but it is even more insulting when the allegation
202. Goldberg, supra note 52, at 263.
203. Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
204. Nebraska ex rel. Freezer Servs., Inc. v. Mullen, 235 Neb. 981, 458 N.W.2d 245
(1990); Nebraska ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Hickman, 245 Neb. 247, 512 N.W.2d
374 (1994).

205. Goldberg, supra note 52, at 262.

1995]

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

comes from a professional peer. Still smarting from the sting of a motion to disqualify, it is understandable how a firm would want to ensure that the entire profession felt the bite of such a rule. This rule
of the
will further erode the amicability currently enjoyed by members
20 6
Nebraska bar, and consequently for the Nebraska courts.
The cost of motions to disqualify in terms of judicial resources is
significant. The United States Supreme Court has noted the significant amount of judicial time and energy required by a motion to disqualify. 2O7 Judges and commentators routinely condemn the quantity
of time spent on these type of collateral issues that divert the courts
and the parties from the substantive dispute. 20 S The Nebraska bright
line rule, in engendering a wider use of the motion to disqualify, will
have a significant impact on how the Nebraska courts spend their
most precious resource-time.
C.

Harm to the Public

The strongest criticism that can be leveled against the Nebraska
rule is the harm it does to clients, and through them, the public. As
one observer astutely observed:
[In a country which values individual liberty and where the freedom of association and the freedom to contract are constitutionally protected, more deference should be given to a client's right to keep his [sic] lawyer of choice,
certainly to keep the law firm of his [sic] choice. This should be true particularly when that client has invested much time and money with those
lawyers. 2 09

A rule which disqualifies entire firms based only on knowledge imputed to a single attorney does nothing to protect a client's reasonable
expectation of confidentiality. It does, however, force irreparable
hardship on the second client. The second client is deprived of the
counsel of his/her choice and all of the work that the attorney has pro21 0
vided for the client, frequently at the client's considerable expense.
206. Jordon, supra note 7, at 1 (observing that "some see a decline in civility [in the
Nebraska bar, with] lawyers allowing combativeness to turn into improper conduct rather than treating one another with professionalism.").
207. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424,434-36 (1985). See also Board of
Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979)(stating that courts should
hesitate to disqualify counsel and must carefully weigh needs of efficient judicial
administration against effect of attorney's conduct).
208. See, e.g., Von Graafeiland, supra note 199, at 140-41 (noting strategic use of disqualification motions and concluding higher quality of representation attainable
with less expenditure of judicial time than currently consumed by motions to disqualify); Goldberg, supra note 52, at 262.
209. Anderson, supra note 134, at 33.
210. The Nebraska Supreme Court has not relented when it comes to the cost of disqualification to clients. In Nebraska ex re. First Tier Bank v. Mullen, 248 Neb.
384, 534 N.W.2d 575 (1995), the court held that work product is not priviledged
when supplied by a disqualified firm to subsequent counsel. It is also of more
than passing interest to note that the court expressly disapproved of any fee
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Other commentators have identified additional costs to the second client by disqualification: "The client [loses not just a law firm but] an
individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. Moreover, most
clients find selecting counsel and preparing for litigation sufficiently
harrowing experiences that they will do almost anything to avoid
them once. The system exacts a high price when clients have to suffer
twice." 2 11
Even if a client is lucky enough to have not chosen a firm or an
individual attorney that is vulnerable to a motion to disqualify, he/she
will still be apportioned a cost of the new Nebraska rule. First, since
Nebraska firms, leery of the applicability of imputed disqualification,
are reducing or in some cases ending their utilization of law clerks,
many routine drafting matters and much time-consuming research
will now have to be completed by attorneys. While this is not a difference the client will see when presented with the final work product, it
certainly is a difference they will see when presented the final bill.
Firms routinely bill law clerks' time at a fraction of the charge for an
attorney's time. 2 12 Thus, one result of the Nebraska rule is to increase the cost of legal services, a cost which is already prohibitive for
too many.

21 3

A second harm worked on clients is more subtle, but in the end
eminently more destructive. As Dennis Carlson, the Nebraska Bar
Association's Counsel for Discipline observed, clients are becoming
more demanding and knowledgeable about the law. While discussing
this trio of cases at the 1994 Survey of Nebraska Law, Mr. Carlson
advised that attorneys refuse to discuss the facts of a matter with any
client at the initial consultation, suggesting that an informed client
might intentionally seek the services of opposing counsel in order to
facilitate the bringing of a motion to disqualify.214 While Mr. Carlson
agreement between the two firms which would allow the disqualified firm to recover fees earned or expenses incurred before disqualification. Id. at 391, 534
N.W.2d at 580 ("[Sluccessor legal counsel's argument that Lieben Dahlk [,the disqualified firm,] is entitled to quantum meruit fees in representing the plaintiffs
also lacks merit. We do not accept the contention that an attorney can receive
fees for representation which from the outset gives the appearance of impropriety
and is violative of established rules of professional conduct."). Notice that the
attorneys most likely affected by this additional stricture are those that work for
clients unable to pay by the hour and who are thus likely to have a large receivable at the time of disqualification. Once again, those ultimately hurt most by this
rule are clients of low to moderate means.
211. Goldberg, supra note 52, at 263-64.
212. Interview with Sue Kirkland, Assistant Dean, Career Services Director, University of Nebraska College of Law, in Lincoln, Neb. (October 27, 1994).
213. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 17, at 1035-63.

214. Dennis G. Carlson, Esq., Counsel for Discipline, Nebraska State Bar Association,
Address at 1994 Annual Institute on the Survey of Nebraska Law (sponsored by
The Young Law. Sec. of the Neb. St. B. Ass'n and Univ. of Neb. C. of L.)(Sept. 30,
1994).
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may be providing attorneys with sound advice, this view suggests that
the Nebraska rule promotes suspicion, not only of the public toward
attorneys, but of attorneys toward clients in general. This approach
signals the beginning of an era of mutual suspicion, in which attorneys are skeptical of the motivations of clients, viewing them, not as
people with problems to be resolved, but as potential infiltrators, seeking to deny the firm of its existing clients and to besmirch its hard
earned reputation. The reaction of the public when confronted with
the suspicion, will justifiably be more hostility and distrust of the legal
profession.
VII.

SOLUTION

At its 1994 annual meeting, the Nebraska State Bar Association
held an open meeting to discuss the impact of this new rule.215 Representatives from Nebraska law schools, the Nebraska Legal Assistant's
Association, as well as members of the practicing bar attended the
meeting.21 6 After this meeting, the Nebraska State Bar Association
passed a resolution asking the Court to adopt Model Rule 1.9.
Model Rule 1.9 adopts the holding in Silver Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.21 7 which limited disqualification to circumstances in which the challenged attorney had acquired actual client confidences.218 The rule provides in relevant part:
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired [protected] information... that is
material to the matter;
219
unless the former client consents after consultation.

The comment to Rule 1.9 recognizes that "competing considerations" require some flexibility regarding conflict of interest questions. 2 20 The comment then explains that:
215. Telephone Interview with Dennis Carlson, Counsel for Discipline, Nebraska
State Bar Association (October 28, 1994).
216. Id.
217. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
218. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
219. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.9 (1989).
220. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.9 cmt. (1989). The comment ex-

plains that:
When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their
association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must
be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not
compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel.
Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming
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Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved
has actual knowledge of [protected] information.... Thus, if a lawyer while
with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular
client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another
or related matter even though the interests of the two cliclient in the 2same
21
ents conflict.

Thus, Rule 1.9 makes the first presumption rebuttable, "de-

pend[ing] on a situation's particular facts."2 22 This rule sensibly rec-

ognizes that a migratory attorney poses no danger to client
confidences unless he/she has actual knowledge of those confidences.
Under this approach an attorney (or law clerk or legal secretary) can
inform a potential employer of his/her actual conflicts, and the two
parties can together assess the risk of a motion to disqualify if they
join forces. This alleviates much of the uncertainty that now discourages employee mobility. It will also decrease the danger of a burgeoning number of these motions reaching the courts, since
presumably, an employer will be unlikely to hire attorneys or staff
who have actual conflicts. This is the approach adopted by the state
courts of Florida, among others.2 23 It should be noted that under this
rule, Freezer Services2 24 and Creighton2 25 would remain intact-in
those cases the challenged employee did possess actual knowledge.
The only precedent that would be displaced by adoption of Model Rule
1.9 is FrsTier22 6 where the challenged attorney only possessed imputed knowledge.
The best solution in terms of preserving mobility, of course, would
be for the Nebraska court to adopt a rule allowing both presumptions
to be rebutted. This is the approach adopted by Michigan 2 27 and Illinew associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous
association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many
lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their
practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical
curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.
Id.

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

The comment then goes on to criticize per se approaches to disqualification, as
well as disqualification based on Canon 9 of the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, concluding, "A rule based on a functional analysis is more appropriate for determining the question of vicarious disqualification." Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
Nebraska ex rel. Freezer Servs. v. Mullen, 235 Neb. 981, 458 N.W.2d 245 (1990).
Nebraska ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Hickman, 245 Neb. 247, 512 N.W.2d 374
(1994).
Nebraska ex rel. FirsTier Bank, NA. v. Buckley, 244 Neb. 36, 503 N.W.2d 838
(1993).
See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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nois, 228 among others, as well as the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.229
The court could then act to preserve actual client confidences through
stringent application of the requirements of an effective screening device as, for example, the Seventh Circuit has done,2S0 or by including
rigorous requirements in the rule allowing the screen as Oregon231
and Pennsylvania232 have done. This approach does the most to protect all of the competing interests involved in imputed disqualification:
attorneys and legal staff are assured a maximum of employment mobility, the prior client's secrets are protected when they are actually at
risk, and the subsequent client's choice of counsel is protected in all
but the factual circumstances where prior client confidences are actually threatened.
At a minimum, the Nebraska Supreme Court should overrule the
bright line rule announced in FirsTier2 =3 and limit FreezerServices23 4
and Creighton2 35 to their facts. The Nebraska Supreme Court has
previously shown its willingness to overrule precedent because it has
proven unworkable or undesirable.236 The court should exhibit simi228. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.

230. The approach in these jurisdictions is to allow for the presumptions to be rebutted, but to strictly adhere to stringent requirements in actually rebutting the second presumption. See, e.g., Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir.
1983)(outlining three part analysis to determine whether challenged firm should
be disqualified that includes rebutting the second presumption through the use of
ethical wall, but concluding that the challenged firm in the instant case must be
disqualified because the firm "at the time of [the tainted attorney]'s transfer did
not have specific institutional mechanisms ... to insure that [the tainted attorney] would have no contact with the [case in litigation]"); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD
Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983)(holding that presumption that confidences gained during previous employment rebuttable, but not rebutted when
challenged firm failed to prove that the "individuals [representing the client] had
not received any relevant confidential information about [that client's adverse
party] from [the tainted attorney]"); LaSalle Nat. Bank v. County of Lake, 703
F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983)(disqualifying challenged firm because screening mechanism not instituted early enough). See also Moser, supra note 121, at 410, for a
discussion of factual situations wherein ethical walls would not be appropriate.
231. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
233. Nebraska ex rel. FirsTier Bank, NA. v. Buckley, 244 Neb. 36, 503 N.W.2d 838
(1993).
234. Nebraska ex rel. Freezer Servs. v. Mullen, 235 Neb. 981, 458 N.W.2d 245 (1990).
235. Nebraska ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Hickman, 245 Neb. 247, 512 N.W.2d 374
(1994).
236. See, e.g., Kerrey Constr. Co. v. Hunt, 213 Neb. 776, 781, 331 N.W.2d 519, 522
(1983)(overruling previous rule disallowing damages for loss of a prospective sale
of land arising out of a breach of contract action on the grounds that allowing
such claims would be "reasonable"); Brezina v. Hill, 195 Neb. 481, 484-85, 238
N.W.2d 903, 906 (1976)(overruling prior decision allowing broker to sign a sales
agreement for the owner without express authorization on policy grounds); Yellow Cab Co. v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm'n, 176 Neb. 711, 714-15, 127 N.W.2d
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lar prudence in this case and retreat from taking an inflexible stance
regarding imputed disqualification. In so doing, the court would signal that Nebraska, like other American jurisdictions, is grappling
with the conflict problems created by an increasing firm size and attorney mobility. The FirsTier2a7decision did not create the conflict of
interest problem and overruling the bright line rule will not end all
attorney conflicts of interest. However, overruling FirsTier'sbright
line rule will allow Nebraska courts and practitioners to focus on how
to protect actual client confidences, rather than diverting attention to
invented conflicts. To do anything less would be a disservice to the
constituency the court is diligently working to protect: the public.
The Nebraska Supreme Court should act to make the rules regarding vicarious disqualification more flexible. Ideally, it should do so by
allowing both presumptions to be rebutted. In the alternative, it could
heed the Nebraska State Bar Association's recommendation and adopt
Model Rule 1.9. Regardless of other measures taken, the Court should
confine Freezer Services23S and Creighton23 9 to their facts, and overrule FirsTier's2 40 bright line rule.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Julius Caesar may not recognize today's legal system, but his
words still have weight.2 4 1 Disqualification of the challenged firms
may have been appropriate measures in Nebraska ex rel. FreezerServices, Inc. v. Mullen,242 Nebraska ex rel. FirsTierBank, NA v. Buckley,2 43 and Nebraska ex rel. Creighton University v. Hickman,24 4 but
the rigid rule laid down in these cases make bad precedent. The Nebraska court is alone in holding that both presumptions regarding
communication of client confidences are irrebuttable and subsequently in allowing double imputation to operate. The mischief done
by such a rule has already disrupted the legal profession, the courts,
and will soon impact the public. A rigid approach to imputed disquali211, 214 (1964)(overruling prior decision that implied a state regulatory agency's
rulings need merely employ the words contained in the relevant statute to consti237.
238.
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tute a specific finding of fact on the grounds that such a change was necessitated
by practical considerations).
Nebraska ex re. FirsTier Bank, NA. v. Buckley, 244 Neb. 36, 503 N.W.2d 838
(1993).
Nebraska ex rel. Freezer Servs. v. Mullen, 235 Neb. 981, 458 N.W.2d 245 (1990).
Nebraska ex re!. Creighton Univ. v. Hickman, 245 Neb. 247, 512 N.W.2d 374
(1994).
Nebraska ex re. FirsTier Bank, NA. v. Buckley, 244 Neb. 36, 503 N.W.2d 838
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See SALLUsT, supra note 1.
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fication robs attorneys and legal staff of their economic and professional freedom. It will clog the Nebraska courts with increasingly
bitter and tactical motions to disqualify. The rule will not increase the
public's esteem for the bar, it will encourage clients to view the legal
profession with contempt as they are forced to witness (not to mention
to pay for) often petty meaningless squabbles between lawyers that do
nothing to protect client confidences and serve only to increase the
time and expense of our adversarial system. The Nebraska Supreme
Court should not turn blindly away from the realities of the modem
practice of law by pursuing a standard of propriety that, while initially
appealing, is unattainable and ultimately undesirable.
The most sensible approach for the court to take would be to limit
Nebraska ex rel. FreezerServices, Inc. v. Mullen,245 Nebraska ex rel.
FirsTierBank, N. v. Buckley,246 and Nebraskaex rel. Creighton University v. Hickman24 7 to their facts, and to allow legal professionals to
present evidence to rebut either presumption when challenged with a
motion to disqualify. In the alternative, the Court should allow the
second presumption to be rebutted when the challenged firm can
prove that effective prophylactic measures have been taken to prevent
the taint from a disqualified attorney from seeping throughout the
rest of the firm. At a minimum, the court should exempt ancillary
staff from this unyielding standard.248 To fail to take some action
would be to endanger the future of the legal profession in Nebraska
and its unique societal role in serving the interests of clients, the
courts, and ultimately justice itself.
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